You might think that NO2ID is against ID cards—and we are—but there is a lot more to it than that. I am of course talking about databases. One thing I have noticed in the UK is that people are starting to act and talk like machines, i.e. they are behaving unintelligently. Databases are concentrations of identifiable data, and they are useful in lots of ways, but our increasing over reliance on them for making real world decisions is very troubling to put it mildly.
I’m grateful to Ross, a NO2ID colleague, for sharing the following personal story which I think is a very good illustrative example of the database state at work.
My wife is American. She came to England in the mid-80s, and was issued a temporary NI number, but never told it was 'temporary'. After about 14 years of living and working in the UK, a new employer pointed out that she was still on a temporary number, and needed (and now long since married to a Brit, was entitled to) a permanent one.
Applications ensued, with me STRESSING that we needed to make sure her contributions up to that point would be transferred to the new number. Were assured they would be.
Soon after, I applied for a projected pension estimate for each of us, to double check. Sure enough, she was deemed to have only just started working in the UK. Phone calls, letters followed. Final result, and here's the punch line, they say 'We have no record of you working in the UK prior to receiving your permanent NI number. IT'S UP TO YOU TO CONTACT YOUR PREVIOUS EMPLOYERS AND PROVIDE US WITH PROOF'.
And that's how the bureaucrat/ database state operates - THEY lose your date, YOU take the blame and suffer the consequences.
BTW, After much effort, we've managed to get some evidence together - not easy as firms previously worked for merge, go bust, lose your records etc, but there are still about 6 years missing - 6 years of NI contributions she'll get no credit or pension for. They even had the nerve to say that she should have kept all her payslips for the previous 14 + years.
What a nightmare! You see if you’re not on the database for some reason you have to start proving that what you say is true: no one will take you at face value. In Thanet last year I produced a birth certificate and passport as proof of identity and was then told by a prospective employer: “but we don’t know who you are.”
Databases: information, information, information, but no ability to judge and assess according to a human set of values—which is fine if you don’t rely on them to make your decisions for you, or rely on them to keep you secure etc. But the ID database that the government is in the process of setting up is a monstrosity, and you are going to be held to account for the accuracy of the information on it, not the government! We say NO to the Database State, which means NO to the ludicrous ID card scheme, NO to more unnecessary databases and NO to the linking up of personal information.
Monday, 15 September 2008
Wednesday, 10 September 2008
TUC to the fore in fight against the ID card scheme
“Congress pledges to resist this [ID] scheme with all means at its disposal”
Thus resolved the TUC recently in Brighton—hurray! NO2ID salutes this landmark resolution which marks a significant step-up in worker resistance to the government’s database-backed ID card scheme, resistance we predicted would emerge back in December last year when Thanet NO2ID was founded.
The motion against the ID scheme, which stated "Congress sees absolutely no value in the scheme or in improvements to security that might flow from this exercise..." was proposed by the pilots' union, BALPA, whose members are among those targeted by the Home Office for compulsory registration on the National Identity Register, the sinister database behind the British ID card. Pilots are intelligent people who can see right through this lamentable scheme, and naturally they are angry about being selected as guinea pigs for its roll out.
Is Stephen Ladyman listening? Considering he was one of the 304 Labour MPs who voted for the undemocratic ID scheme in the first place—something we are not going to forget—one would certainly hope so.
Commenting on the TUC’s resolution Guy Herbert, General Secretary of NO2ID, said
"The Home Office has almost given up pretending that its ID scheme is necessary for national security. Those involved in aviation security day-to-day don't believe it. Now the plan is that ID will confront us in the workplace - as a form of official permission to earn a living. We are delighted that the unions and their members will be ready to fight it."
Meanwhile, I was interested to learn from this BBC report that PA Consulting, the clowns who lost all the criminal records in the land, have had their contract cancelled. But that is too late isn't it, and how come no one ever gets held to account for these outrageous breaches of security? Ultimately the government is responsible and they cannot be trusted to build a secure ID database.
Thus resolved the TUC recently in Brighton—hurray! NO2ID salutes this landmark resolution which marks a significant step-up in worker resistance to the government’s database-backed ID card scheme, resistance we predicted would emerge back in December last year when Thanet NO2ID was founded.
The motion against the ID scheme, which stated "Congress sees absolutely no value in the scheme or in improvements to security that might flow from this exercise..." was proposed by the pilots' union, BALPA, whose members are among those targeted by the Home Office for compulsory registration on the National Identity Register, the sinister database behind the British ID card. Pilots are intelligent people who can see right through this lamentable scheme, and naturally they are angry about being selected as guinea pigs for its roll out.
Is Stephen Ladyman listening? Considering he was one of the 304 Labour MPs who voted for the undemocratic ID scheme in the first place—something we are not going to forget—one would certainly hope so.
Commenting on the TUC’s resolution Guy Herbert, General Secretary of NO2ID, said
"The Home Office has almost given up pretending that its ID scheme is necessary for national security. Those involved in aviation security day-to-day don't believe it. Now the plan is that ID will confront us in the workplace - as a form of official permission to earn a living. We are delighted that the unions and their members will be ready to fight it."
Meanwhile, I was interested to learn from this BBC report that PA Consulting, the clowns who lost all the criminal records in the land, have had their contract cancelled. But that is too late isn't it, and how come no one ever gets held to account for these outrageous breaches of security? Ultimately the government is responsible and they cannot be trusted to build a secure ID database.
Saturday, 30 August 2008
Thanet NO2ID in Dover
Dover NO2ID and Thanet NO2ID joined forces today by, fittingly, the Dover War Memorial. In beautiful sunny weather, and in a good location, the campaigning was effective. We once again got our excellent leaflet into the hands of the public, many of whom may be thinking about this issue seriously for the first time. A few people argued with us, but all discussion was even-tempered and mutual respect was established—we are open to dialogue with anybody. Not a few people signed our petition.There will be a NO2ID benefit gig tonight at The Whole World Café, The Old High Street, Folkestone.
Wednesday, 20 August 2008
Smile and speak/write nicely
Because, according to this interesting article in The Telegraph, you are on average being recorded 3000 times a week!
Sunday, 17 August 2008
Westwood Cross: bring your money, but not your ideas
Thanet NO2ID recently attempted to campaign at the Westwood Cross shopping centre in Broadstairs. Though some people dislike Westwood Cross there is no denying its popularity and we were keen to see if we could make a dent in this privatised zone of unlimited consumption.
Our attempt was always a long shot and sure enough it was not to be. Within about one minute of setting up (in a discreet spot, in nobody’s way and not interfering with any advertising) a black-suited security man toting a walkie-talkie came over and indicated by his body language that we were not welcome. I went over and engaged with this man, in my usual diplomatic manner, and he confirmed that without permission from the management we had to pack up and move on. Before leaving I tried to secure permission from the said management to campaign and they told me to contact a company called “Space and People”, based in Glasgow of all places, to seek permission, but the management man (always a man) added that anything “political” was basically not going to be allowed.
Of course, we are not going to contact that company—why should we? Here is Thanet, not Glasgow. After leaving Westwood Cross we took our campaign to Ramsgate where we got a good response from the good Thanet/Ramsgate public. But it bothers me that an important site of struggle has been closed off to us.
Some people might say that at least Westwood Cross is being consistent in not allowing any political campaigning. But actually there is no such thing as a neutral political position and by not allowing political campaigning Westwood Cross effectively serves the interests of the ruling class who increasingly seek to keep us all in line with CCTV and yet more rules about what we can and cannot do. Is this really a free country?
Our attempt was always a long shot and sure enough it was not to be. Within about one minute of setting up (in a discreet spot, in nobody’s way and not interfering with any advertising) a black-suited security man toting a walkie-talkie came over and indicated by his body language that we were not welcome. I went over and engaged with this man, in my usual diplomatic manner, and he confirmed that without permission from the management we had to pack up and move on. Before leaving I tried to secure permission from the said management to campaign and they told me to contact a company called “Space and People”, based in Glasgow of all places, to seek permission, but the management man (always a man) added that anything “political” was basically not going to be allowed.
Of course, we are not going to contact that company—why should we? Here is Thanet, not Glasgow. After leaving Westwood Cross we took our campaign to Ramsgate where we got a good response from the good Thanet/Ramsgate public. But it bothers me that an important site of struggle has been closed off to us.
Some people might say that at least Westwood Cross is being consistent in not allowing any political campaigning. But actually there is no such thing as a neutral political position and by not allowing political campaigning Westwood Cross effectively serves the interests of the ruling class who increasingly seek to keep us all in line with CCTV and yet more rules about what we can and cannot do. Is this really a free country?
Monday, 11 August 2008
NO2ID and the Art of Campaigning
Thanet NO2ID has been actively campaigning on the street in a summer offensive. Campaigning is a great experience and I always feel refreshed by the struggle. But there again it is not that much of struggle—very few people are in favour of the government’s ID database scheme once it has been properly explained to them what it all entails. Loads of Thanet people have signed our NO2ID petition.
One thing we say to people is that we are not against ID cards per se (though there is enough ID about already), but strongly oppose the National Identity Register (NIR). The NIR will hold all your information and will be shared about by government. That is wrong period. ID cards will be linked to this very dangerous database if the government gets its way.
Some people say to us is that the government has all our information already. Well, there is some truth to this assertion but the government does not have all that information concentrated in one place and on tap as it were. Currently, information about us is held on multiple databases and in separate domains, and that is the way it should be. The idea of “joined up” government is silly beyond words and breaks all common sense rules about protecting data.
Understandably, a few people are defeatist and believe the government will do whatever it likes anyway. This negativism is unjustified, however, and it is a fact that with a just cause campaigning does make a difference. Politicians are forced to listen to us, even if they don’t like what they hear, and if they get it wrong—and New Labour has got it very wrong on ID cards—then it is within our ability to see that they do not remain in power.
Speaking of which, it was with some disappointment that I recently learned from one of our members that Stephen Ladyman, Thanet South MP, remains committed to the ID database scheme. I suppose it is hard to admit you got something so very wrong, but it is not too late for Dr Ladyman to take another look at this flawed scheme, and we urge him to do so.
What can you do?
1.Consider getting a new passport now before passports are linked to the NIR.
2.Get informed about the ID scheme and join/make a donation to NO2ID.
3.Write to Stephen Ladyman to express your dissatisfaction with the ID scheme if he is your local MP. (When writing to MPs you should put your point of view across politely but assertively. Don’t write until you grasp the issue fully.)
4. Be cautious about giving out your information.
Educate your children about their rights and ensure that they refuse to be fingerprinted.
5. Join our Thanet campaign by coming to a meeting or joining a stall.
NO2ID now has over 40,000 members nationally. Canterbury NO2ID and Dover NO2ID are both active in East Kent. There are other groups all over the country, and a Maidstone NO2ID group was recently formed. Join our fight to keep Britain free.
One thing we say to people is that we are not against ID cards per se (though there is enough ID about already), but strongly oppose the National Identity Register (NIR). The NIR will hold all your information and will be shared about by government. That is wrong period. ID cards will be linked to this very dangerous database if the government gets its way.
Some people say to us is that the government has all our information already. Well, there is some truth to this assertion but the government does not have all that information concentrated in one place and on tap as it were. Currently, information about us is held on multiple databases and in separate domains, and that is the way it should be. The idea of “joined up” government is silly beyond words and breaks all common sense rules about protecting data.
Understandably, a few people are defeatist and believe the government will do whatever it likes anyway. This negativism is unjustified, however, and it is a fact that with a just cause campaigning does make a difference. Politicians are forced to listen to us, even if they don’t like what they hear, and if they get it wrong—and New Labour has got it very wrong on ID cards—then it is within our ability to see that they do not remain in power.
Speaking of which, it was with some disappointment that I recently learned from one of our members that Stephen Ladyman, Thanet South MP, remains committed to the ID database scheme. I suppose it is hard to admit you got something so very wrong, but it is not too late for Dr Ladyman to take another look at this flawed scheme, and we urge him to do so.
What can you do?
1.Consider getting a new passport now before passports are linked to the NIR.
2.Get informed about the ID scheme and join/make a donation to NO2ID.
3.Write to Stephen Ladyman to express your dissatisfaction with the ID scheme if he is your local MP. (When writing to MPs you should put your point of view across politely but assertively. Don’t write until you grasp the issue fully.)
4. Be cautious about giving out your information.
Educate your children about their rights and ensure that they refuse to be fingerprinted.
5. Join our Thanet campaign by coming to a meeting or joining a stall.
NO2ID now has over 40,000 members nationally. Canterbury NO2ID and Dover NO2ID are both active in East Kent. There are other groups all over the country, and a Maidstone NO2ID group was recently formed. Join our fight to keep Britain free.
Saturday, 28 June 2008
High level reports confirm dangers of government’s looney ID-database scheme
Quite a lot has been going on recently. Among other things, the public’s attention is now temporarily focused on the issue of excessive surveillance. NO2ID is certainly concerned about the burgeoning surveillance society, and we would question, for example, whether it was really necessary to set up such an expensive, though essentially limited, high-tech surveillance operation at the recent Margate Land Air Show, which you can observe in this video.
It seems the police had those cameras there as a means to enforce good behaviour. The terrible message given to the public is: we don’t trust you. But this kind of high-tech surveillance is actually far inferior to having two police officers just walking about keeping there eyes open for trouble. The impression you get is that the police are actually hiding behind their technology.
Last month an important Home Affairs Committee report posed the question: “A Surveillance Society?” The report makes fascinating reading, not least because it clearly highlights the dangerous propensity of the current government to engage in obsessive surveillance and unnecessarily grab information. Interestingly, in this report one senior detective testified to the committee that only about three percent of crimes were solved thanks to CCTV evidence—a lot less than one might imagine—and that “billions” spent on high-tech kit could have been better spent on, for example, having more trained police on the streets.
But it was what the Home Affairs report had to say about databases that really struck a chord with me, and with all those fighting against the government’s looney ID-database scheme: “In the design of its policies and systems for collecting data, the government should adopt a principle of data minimisation. It should collect only what is essential, to be stored only for as long as necessary.”
Bang on. But the government’s ID-database scheme operates on totally different principles: it operates on the principle of data maximisation. It wants to collect all kinds of information about you, including biometric information which cannot be replaced. It wants to store this information on a centralised database and keep it forever. Your identity, in other words, will become government property, and it will be shared about willy-nilly.
The government’s database-linked Identity cards are so dangerous because, as the Home Affairs report notes, technologies such as internet search engines potentially make our personal information available to anybody at the click of a mouse. And once your info is out there in cyberspace, your privacy has gone forever. In addition, the National Identity Register—the centralised database where the government plans to keep your information—will allow government to start profiling people, a very sinister prospect but one that is very much on the cards.
The government’s misuse and loss of data, and obsessive surveillance will, the Home Affairs report suggests, contribute to individual’s withdrawing co-operation from authority: “…the risks associated with the collection and use of personal information in databases in particular and the monitoring of individual’s behaviour in general, should not be underestimated. Mistakes or misuse of data can result in serious practical harm to individuals. Those less demonstrable risks which relate to the erosion of one’s sense of privacy or individual liberty also have a practical aspect and a broad application in that they affect the way in which citizens interacts with the state.”
Speaking of privacy, should you surrender and sign up on the National Identity Register (NIR) you simply won’t have any privacy left. You’ll be tagged for life. In a barely concealed criticism of the government’s database-linked Identity scheme, the Home Affairs report calls on the government to stop the blanket collection of identifiable transaction data—that’s the audit trail created every time you use your ID card. The government should change their mindset of collecting more data than is needed, says the report. Are the government listening? Nope. Andy Burnham, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, recently had the temerity to suggest that no one in this country had a right to anonymity.
The Home Affairs report calls for an “explicit statement that the NIR will not be used as a matter of routine to monitor the activities of individuals.” Here NO2ID parts company with the report; we say: the NIR places far too much power in the hands of the state, DON’T REGISTER ON THE NIR IN THE FIRST PLACE. We cannot trust government “assurances” which are mere platitudes but not legal rights. Why the hell should the Home Secretary have the right to know everything about me when I do not have a similar right to view her information? Why should no less than one hundred people—we discover from testimony in the Home Affairs report—have total access to all my personal information when experience in the private banking sector shows that at least one in a hundred people will do something corrupt given half the chance?
Think on good people of Thanet. “If you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear”—what a load rubbish! Governments kill a lot more people than terrorists do, and we must make government accountable to us and not the other way round. What about Germany in the 1930s—all those nice respectable Jewish people had nothing to hide, and look what happened to them. I am obviously not trying to equate the present British government with the Nazis here, but rather am emphasising a point: in a democracy we are in charge of the government, and it is the government who must be accountable to us. We have to stay in charge, and keeping control of our identities is integral to the democratic project.
Which brings me on to the Treasury’s “Challenges and Opportunities in identity assurance” report published the month prior to the Home Affairs report thus far referred to. Bless you, Sir James Crosby, a voice of reason. The Treasury in this neat report put forward a very good case for having a universal identity scheme. But, crucially, they lay out the democratic principles on which such a scheme must be based:
1. The purpose of any scheme should be restricted to enabling citizens to assert their identity
2. Governance should inspire trust. It should be independent of Government
3. The amount of data stored should be minimised. Full biometric images (other than photographs) should not be kept
4. Citizens should "own" their entry. It should not be possible, except for national security, for any data to be shared without informed consent
5. Enrolment should minimise costs and give citizens a hassle-free experience
6. To respond to consumers and give benefits, it should be capable of being rolled out quickly
7. Citizens who lose cards or whose identity is compromised should be able to get it fixed quickly and efficiently
8. The scheme's systems should work with existing, efficient, bank systems to reduce risks
9. To engage consumers enrolment and cards should be provided free of charge
10. The market should play a role in creating standards, to ensure ease of use and minimise costs
All this is perfectly reasonable and sensible and could form the basis of an alternative identity scheme—NO2ID is not opposed to identity cards per se. But in fact the present Identity scheme, being implemented by the Home Office, breaks every one of the Treasury’s summary list of principles. What we cannot accept is the shape of the present Identity scheme, the lunatic grab for power, the obsession with surveillance. Commenting on the Treasury’s idea of Identity assurance, Sir James notes: “ID assurance is not ID management, in which an organisation keeps close track of people and their movement. The distinction between the two is fundamental. ID management is designed to benefit the holder of the information; ID assurance is focused on bringing benefits to the consumer.”
All this is old news though. “The LSE Identity Report”, authored by a whole slew experts sponsored by the London School of Economics in 2005, convincingly demonstrated that the present Identity-database scheme is flawed in both principle and in design, and would be ridiculously expensive to implement. The report, constructively, went on to suggest an alternative model for an identity card, one in line with the Treasury’s principles. The government’s reaction was to nitpick over some details of the LSE’s suggested alternative, and deny the super high costs of their own scheme. You see, the government does not listen, not even to the many bright people within its own party, the government executive and in academia.
Conclusion: New Labour’s identity-database scheme is in the long run doomed, another example of hubris. But how much damage to democracy can we accept in the meanwhile? People of Thanet take up the cudgels and join NO2ID right now.
It seems the police had those cameras there as a means to enforce good behaviour. The terrible message given to the public is: we don’t trust you. But this kind of high-tech surveillance is actually far inferior to having two police officers just walking about keeping there eyes open for trouble. The impression you get is that the police are actually hiding behind their technology.
Last month an important Home Affairs Committee report posed the question: “A Surveillance Society?” The report makes fascinating reading, not least because it clearly highlights the dangerous propensity of the current government to engage in obsessive surveillance and unnecessarily grab information. Interestingly, in this report one senior detective testified to the committee that only about three percent of crimes were solved thanks to CCTV evidence—a lot less than one might imagine—and that “billions” spent on high-tech kit could have been better spent on, for example, having more trained police on the streets.
But it was what the Home Affairs report had to say about databases that really struck a chord with me, and with all those fighting against the government’s looney ID-database scheme: “In the design of its policies and systems for collecting data, the government should adopt a principle of data minimisation. It should collect only what is essential, to be stored only for as long as necessary.”
Bang on. But the government’s ID-database scheme operates on totally different principles: it operates on the principle of data maximisation. It wants to collect all kinds of information about you, including biometric information which cannot be replaced. It wants to store this information on a centralised database and keep it forever. Your identity, in other words, will become government property, and it will be shared about willy-nilly.
The government’s database-linked Identity cards are so dangerous because, as the Home Affairs report notes, technologies such as internet search engines potentially make our personal information available to anybody at the click of a mouse. And once your info is out there in cyberspace, your privacy has gone forever. In addition, the National Identity Register—the centralised database where the government plans to keep your information—will allow government to start profiling people, a very sinister prospect but one that is very much on the cards.
The government’s misuse and loss of data, and obsessive surveillance will, the Home Affairs report suggests, contribute to individual’s withdrawing co-operation from authority: “…the risks associated with the collection and use of personal information in databases in particular and the monitoring of individual’s behaviour in general, should not be underestimated. Mistakes or misuse of data can result in serious practical harm to individuals. Those less demonstrable risks which relate to the erosion of one’s sense of privacy or individual liberty also have a practical aspect and a broad application in that they affect the way in which citizens interacts with the state.”
Speaking of privacy, should you surrender and sign up on the National Identity Register (NIR) you simply won’t have any privacy left. You’ll be tagged for life. In a barely concealed criticism of the government’s database-linked Identity scheme, the Home Affairs report calls on the government to stop the blanket collection of identifiable transaction data—that’s the audit trail created every time you use your ID card. The government should change their mindset of collecting more data than is needed, says the report. Are the government listening? Nope. Andy Burnham, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, recently had the temerity to suggest that no one in this country had a right to anonymity.
The Home Affairs report calls for an “explicit statement that the NIR will not be used as a matter of routine to monitor the activities of individuals.” Here NO2ID parts company with the report; we say: the NIR places far too much power in the hands of the state, DON’T REGISTER ON THE NIR IN THE FIRST PLACE. We cannot trust government “assurances” which are mere platitudes but not legal rights. Why the hell should the Home Secretary have the right to know everything about me when I do not have a similar right to view her information? Why should no less than one hundred people—we discover from testimony in the Home Affairs report—have total access to all my personal information when experience in the private banking sector shows that at least one in a hundred people will do something corrupt given half the chance?
Think on good people of Thanet. “If you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear”—what a load rubbish! Governments kill a lot more people than terrorists do, and we must make government accountable to us and not the other way round. What about Germany in the 1930s—all those nice respectable Jewish people had nothing to hide, and look what happened to them. I am obviously not trying to equate the present British government with the Nazis here, but rather am emphasising a point: in a democracy we are in charge of the government, and it is the government who must be accountable to us. We have to stay in charge, and keeping control of our identities is integral to the democratic project.
Which brings me on to the Treasury’s “Challenges and Opportunities in identity assurance” report published the month prior to the Home Affairs report thus far referred to. Bless you, Sir James Crosby, a voice of reason. The Treasury in this neat report put forward a very good case for having a universal identity scheme. But, crucially, they lay out the democratic principles on which such a scheme must be based:
1. The purpose of any scheme should be restricted to enabling citizens to assert their identity
2. Governance should inspire trust. It should be independent of Government
3. The amount of data stored should be minimised. Full biometric images (other than photographs) should not be kept
4. Citizens should "own" their entry. It should not be possible, except for national security, for any data to be shared without informed consent
5. Enrolment should minimise costs and give citizens a hassle-free experience
6. To respond to consumers and give benefits, it should be capable of being rolled out quickly
7. Citizens who lose cards or whose identity is compromised should be able to get it fixed quickly and efficiently
8. The scheme's systems should work with existing, efficient, bank systems to reduce risks
9. To engage consumers enrolment and cards should be provided free of charge
10. The market should play a role in creating standards, to ensure ease of use and minimise costs
All this is perfectly reasonable and sensible and could form the basis of an alternative identity scheme—NO2ID is not opposed to identity cards per se. But in fact the present Identity scheme, being implemented by the Home Office, breaks every one of the Treasury’s summary list of principles. What we cannot accept is the shape of the present Identity scheme, the lunatic grab for power, the obsession with surveillance. Commenting on the Treasury’s idea of Identity assurance, Sir James notes: “ID assurance is not ID management, in which an organisation keeps close track of people and their movement. The distinction between the two is fundamental. ID management is designed to benefit the holder of the information; ID assurance is focused on bringing benefits to the consumer.”
All this is old news though. “The LSE Identity Report”, authored by a whole slew experts sponsored by the London School of Economics in 2005, convincingly demonstrated that the present Identity-database scheme is flawed in both principle and in design, and would be ridiculously expensive to implement. The report, constructively, went on to suggest an alternative model for an identity card, one in line with the Treasury’s principles. The government’s reaction was to nitpick over some details of the LSE’s suggested alternative, and deny the super high costs of their own scheme. You see, the government does not listen, not even to the many bright people within its own party, the government executive and in academia.
Conclusion: New Labour’s identity-database scheme is in the long run doomed, another example of hubris. But how much damage to democracy can we accept in the meanwhile? People of Thanet take up the cudgels and join NO2ID right now.
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